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Abstract
The recent European debt crisis has sparked a heated debate on the merits of fiscal austerity.
Since the main objective of the proposed fiscal tightenings is to reduce sovereign default risk, the
solution to this debate depends on the costs of a sovereign debt restructuring. One important cost is
its negative effect on the banking system. This paper extends an off-the-shelf macroeconomic model
with financial frictions in order to quantitatively assess the costs of financial disruption ensuing from
a sovereign debt restructuring. Results show that the losses from financial disruption are offset by
the benefits of a less contractionary fiscal policy. Government size is crucial for the relative effects of
financial disruption as austerity becomes substantially more costly when tax rates are large.
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1 Introduction
A large part of policy discussion in the last couple of years has focused on the possibility of
sovereign default by the so called GIIPS. One important topic in discussion has been the
deleterious effect of sovereign debt restructuring on the banking system and, consequently,
on the economy as a whole. The mechanism runs as follows: sovereign debt restructuring
leads to lower price for sovereign debt, and thus implies a reduction in the value of
banks’ assets. This in turn forces banks to deleverage, reducing credit in the economy
and leading to a sharp fall in economic activity. Avoiding the need for sovereign debt
restructuring has thus been a top priority of European policy makers. In response to
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this issue, large primary surpluses have been proposed, and often implemented, in those
European countries facing the risk of default.1
Despite the importance of this topic, there is a shortage of model-based quantitative
assessments of the effects of the financial disruption caused by sovereign default on eco-
nomic activity. The contribution of this paper is a quantitative assessment of the effects
of an exogenous debt restructuring episode. An off-the-shelf macroeconomic model with
financial frictions along the lines of Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) and Gertler and Karadi
(2011) is extended to allow for sovereign debt.2 Leverage-constrained banks hold govern-
ment bonds. We simulate a debt restructuring episode in which banks suffer portfolio
losses and study the effects this has on the economy.
The model portrays a closed economy, calibrated to capture some key features of the
Euroarea. Debt restructuring is modelled as a sharp fall in current debt payments that
phases out over time. By negatively affecting banks’ balance sheets, a debt restructuring
episode forces them to deleverage. However, a reduction in the government’s debt servicing
needs allows for a reduction in taxes – which is captured in the model by an exogenous
fiscal rule. Since the objective of the paper is to understand financial disruption as a cost
of sovereign default, debt restructuring leads to no other cost to the economy.
In a version of the model with lump-sum taxes, the financial disruption ensuing from
a debt restructuring episode leads to a reduction in economic activity. Investment drops
leading to a persistent reduction in output. However, the deleterious effects of financial
disruption are more than offset by the stimulus in the economy provided by a reduction
in distortionary taxes. In a version of the model with labour taxes, sovereign debt re-
structuring leads to a decrease in investment that affects capital formation in the short
and medium run. However, it also allows for a reduction in distortionary taxation that
leads to an increase in labour supply. Overall, output and welfare increase.
Sovereign default is a transfer, not a destruction of wealth. A default episode tightens
the constraints on banks and forces them to deleverage, which leads to lower investment
and lower output. However, it also loosens the government’s budget constraint, allowing
for a less contractionary fiscal policy. The theoretical net effect on output and welfare
is thus ambiguous, so the policy question calls for a quantitative analysis. This paper
models financial frictions and distortionary taxation in a standard way and the effect of
1For recent contributions to this policy debate, see VoxEU columns from Paˆris and Wyplosz (2014), Mody (2014) and
Buiter (2014).
2This framework has been used and extended in several directions. Examples include Villa and Yang (2011), Gertler,
Kiyotaki and Queralto (2012), Aerosa and Coelho (2013), Dedola, Karadi and Lombardo (2013), Gertler and Karadi (2013),
Meeks, Nelson and Alessandri (2013), Rannenberg (2013), Takamura (2013), Villa (2013) and Correia et al (2014). Bocola
(2014) also extends Gertler-Kiyotaki framework to study the connection between sovereign risk and financial frictions.
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financial frictions is not important enough to overcome the benefits from lower taxes.
The net impact of debt restructuring on the economy is importantly affected by the
government size. In countries where government spending and tax rates are large, as in
many European countries, the negative effects of financial disruption are dwarfed by the
relief from lower taxes. The marginal losses from taxation are increasing in the level of
taxes, and our results shows this effect is quantitatively important.
Interestingly, a sovereign debt restructuring shock leads to negative effects on output
and consumption if the government sharply reduces taxes in response to its lower bor-
rowing needs. Following the default episode, banks need to deleverage and reduce credit
to the economy. In this scenario, government borrowing crowds out credit to the private
sector, reducing investment and capital accumulation even further. Hence a conservative
fiscal stance in the aftermath of default helps to mitigate the negative effects from the
ensuing financial disruption.
Since we study only one channel through which sovereign default impacts the real
economy, we cannot make positive statements about the effects of sovereign default. Nev-
ertheless, the results in this paper raise questions about the magnitude of the damage
from financial disruption caused by sovereign default in comparison to the costs of tight
fiscal policy that has been needed to avoid debt restructuring.
Our model builds on the literature about the role of financial frictions in business cycles
and the so called “financial accelerator” channel. Many of the main contributions to this
literature introduce financial frictions as an agency problem.3 Gertler and Karadi (2011)
and Gertler, Kiyotaki and Queralto (2012) study the recent financial crisis and the effects
of unconventional monetary policy using a financial accelerator model where banks face a
no-moral-hazard constraint that limits their ability to raise funds. Like in other models in
this literature, these frictions amplify the effects of exogenous shocks to business cycles.4
The paper most closely related to ours is Bocola’s (2014) work on the macroeconomic
implications of sovereign risk. Bocola (2014) also also builds on the Gertler-Karadi-
Kiyotaki framework, but there are important differences between his approach and ours.
While his paper focuses on the effects of shocks to the risk of sovereign default, our
paper considers a policy shock that triggers immediate debt restructuring.5 Moreover,
3See, e.g., Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Bernanke, Gertler
and Gilchrist (1999).
4Boissay, Collard and Smets (2013) expand the financial accelerator framework and are able to generate credit freezes
and banking crises as a result of endogenous pro-cyclical movements in banks’ balance sheets.
5An important finding of Bocola (2014) is that news about sovereign risk generates a precautionary motive for banks to
deleverage (the “risk channel”) in addition to the liquidity channel that is also present in this paper. Owing to the nature
of our policy experiment, the risk channel is not relevant here.
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distortionary taxation is absent from his analysis but key to our results, since the benefits
from relaxing the government’s budget constraint crucially depend on distortions from
taxation. Our model can thus be used to compare the benefits from debt restructuring
and the cost from the ensuing financial disruption.
The results of the paper speak to the literature on the costs of sovereign default.
A central question of this literature, dating back from Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) and
Bulow and Rogoff (1989), is about the nature of the losses from sovereign default episodes,
which is behind the question about why sovereign debt markets exist. In a recent survey
of this literature, Panizza, Zettelmeyer and Sturzenegger (2009) argue there is not much
evidence that external penalties are the main reason why governments repay their debts
and highlight the importance of internal costs following defaults. A recent literature on
debt crises has thus aimed at exploring the channels through which default can trigger
domestic output costs. Brutti (2011), building on Broner and Ventura (2011), presents a
theoretical model where sovereign default leads to liquidity crisis and output losses. This
is the channel we explore in the paper, and the results raise question marks about the
magnitude of those costs.
Empirical work has explored the link between sovereign risk and banks’ financing con-
ditions. Borensztein and Panizza (2008) show empirical evidence that default episodes
tend to magnify the probability of banking crises and domestic credit crunches, associated
to balance sheet effects and confidence collapse. Andritzky (2012) points out that one im-
portant consequence of the subprime crisis was a reversal in investor base for government
securities for some advanced G20 economies. Bank of International Settlements (2011)
reports changes in bank’s balance sheets and funding conditions as a consequence of the
European debt crisis and highlight that an increase in sovereign risk may affect the market
value of banks’ balance sheets through their holdings of sovereign debt. Gennaioli, Martin
and Rossi (2013) provide evidence that sovereign bonds generate a liquidity benefit for
banks in normal times, but become costly during debt crises.6
Our paper is also related to recent research investigating the links between sovereign
risk and macroeconomic stability. Corsetti et al (2013) and Corsetti el al (2014) de-
velop macroeconomic models with financial frictions using Curdia and Woodford’s (2008)
framework, but they assume an exogenous connection between sovereign risk and banks’
spreads (loan over deposit rates), while here this connection is endogenous and crucial for
our analysis. Bolton and Jeanne (2011) analyse theoretically the consequences of debt
crises in a financially integrated world, where a sovereign country’s debt can be used as
6See also De Bruyckere et al (2012) and Popov and Van Horen (2013).
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collateral by banks in other countries. Guerrieri, Iacoviello and Minetti (2012) analyse
the international transmission of sovereign risk and default in the Eurozone through the
banks’ balance sheet channel and show that default in the so called ”periphery countries”
spreads to banks in the core.
This paper is organized as follows. Next section presents the model, Section 3 shows
the results and Section 4 concludes.
2 Model
The stochastic general equilibrium model abstracts from nominal rigidities and mone-
tary policy. The modeling of financial frictions follows Gertler and Karadi (2011) and
Gertler, Kiyotaki and Queralto (2012). The key difference in this model is the inclusion
of a government that issues non-state contingent debt, held by banks only, that can be
defaulted on. Differently from the literature on sovereign default that builds on Eaton
and Gersovitz (1981), our model considers a closed economy. In our calibration, banks’
positions on government debt amount to a large fraction of GDP, so one could think of
our economy as representing the whole Euroarea, where much of each country’s sovereign
debt is held either by domestic creditors or by financial institutions within the block.
The economy is populated by five types of agents: households, good producers, capital
producers, bankers and government.
2.1 Households
There is a representative household with a continuum of members of measure unity, with
a fraction 1 − f that are workers and a fraction f that are bankers. Workers supply
labour and return wages to the family, while bankers own a financial intermediary and
return dividends to their household. Households can save in form of deposits held by
intermediaries. They supply funds to banks in form of non-contingent short term debt
(deposits, denoted Dt), that pay a risk-free gross real return rate Rt. We additionally
assume households can not buy government bonds directly.
Households choose consumption, labour supply and riskless debt to maximize expected
discounted utility. We assume preferences in logaritmic form that follow a GHH specifi-
cation, in order to avoid the wealth effects on labour supply (Greenwood, Hercowitz and
Huffman, 1988).
Et
∞∑
i=0
βi log
[
Ct+i − ψ
1 + ϕ
L1+ϕt+i
]
(1)
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Households are subject to the following budget constraint:
Ct +Dt+1 = WtLt +RtDt + Πt − Tt (2)
where Wt is the wage rate, Tt are taxes payed to the government and Πt are the dividends
obtained from the ownership of nonfinancial firms and banks. We will analyse the case of
both lump sum taxes and distortionary taxes on labour.
From the first order conditions for consumption/saving, we get:
EtβΛt,t+1Rt+1 = 1 (3)
where Λt,t+1 is the households’ stochastic discount factor:
Λt,t+1 ≡ %t+1
%t
and %t is marginal utility of consumption,
%t ≡
(
Ct − ψ
1 + ϕ
L1+ϕt+i
)−1
The first order condition for labour supply depends on the form of taxation.
In every period, there is a probability (1−θ) that a banker becomes a worker. In order
to maintain the fraction in each occupation constant over time, in each period there is a
random fraction (1− θ)f of workers that become bankers. Workers that become bankers
receive a “start up” capital from the household to start business. Expected survival time
of a bank is thus 1/(1 − θ). This prevents bankers from accumulating enough wealth so
as to overcome their financial constraints.
Households also own nonfinancial firms (capital and good producers). However, they
are not able to acquire capital directly or to provide funds to these firms. All financial
intermediation for production must be made by a bank.
2.2 Good producers
The representative firm in this sector produces output in a competitive market, using
labour and capital in a Cobb-Douglas technology:
Yt = K
α
t L
1−α
t (4)
with 0 < α < 1.
As usual, labour demand implies that the real wage rate equals the marginal product
of labour:
Wt = (1− α)Yt
Lt
(5)
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In order to produce in period t+1, firms need to buy the amount of capital Kt+1 at the
end of period t from capital producers. In order to finance the acquisition of capital, firms
issue securities St and an arbitrage condition ensures the value of these securities equals
the value of the capital to be bought. The intermediaries buy these securities. Denoting
by Qt the price of one unity of capital, we have:
QtKt+1 = QtSt
There are no frictions in this process. Intermediaries have perfect information about the
firm and about future payoffs, so securities are state-contingent. Frictions exist within
the process of banks obtaining resources from households.
In order to satisfy the zero profit condition in the competitive market, goods producers
buy capital goods up to the point that gross profits per unit of capital Zt equal the
marginal product of this input:
Zt =
Yt −WtLt
Kt
= α
Yt
Kt
A firm that sells St securities to acquire capital must return all its profits in the next
period to the bank. Call Rkt the gross return to capital in time t, the amount a bank
obtains as a return over each unity of credit supplied in the form of acquired securities.
The representative goods producer owes a bank an amount QtStRkt+1 at the end of the
period. This value equals the sum of profits Πft obtained through capital utilization in
production (gross of capital remuneration) and the market value of the effective non-
depreciated capital, that could be sold back in the market after production has taken
place.
QtStRkt+1 = Πft+1 + (1− δ)Qt+1Kt+1
Substituting for Πft and St and dividing both sides by Kt+1:
QtRkt+1 = α
Yt+1
Kt+1
+ (1− δ)Qt+1
Hence, the gross return to capital in period t+ 1 is given by the ratio between the value
generated by one unity of capital acquired by the firm in period t over the price at which
it was bought.
Rkt+1 =
Zt+1 + (1− δ)Qt+1
Qt
(6)
2.3 Capital producers
The market for capital is competitive. At the end of each period, capital producers build
new capital for the following period using the final output as an input in the production.
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Capital goods are then sold back to good producers at price Qt. They are subject to
convex adjustment costs in this process.7 A capital producer chooses investment It in
order to maximize discounted profits, taking the price of capital Qt as given.
Adjustment costs are a convex function of investment. The capital producers’ problem
is given by:
max Et
∞∑
τ=t
βτ−tΛt,τ
[
QτIτ −
[
1 + f
(
Iτ
Iτ−1
)]
Iτ
]
with f(1) = f ′(1) = 0 and f ′′(1) > 0. Non-zero profits are possible when the economy is
not in steady state, and profits are transfered to the household.
The first order condition for investment is given by:
Qt = 1 + f
(
It
It−1
)
+
It
It−1
f ′
(
It
It−1
)
− EtβΛt,t+1
(
It+1
It
)2
f ′
(
It+1
It
)
(7)
This condition states that capital price will equal the marginal cost of investment.
The adjustment cost function assumes the form:
f(.) =
ηi
2
(
It
It−1
− 1
)2
where ηi refers to the inverse elasticity of investment with respect to the price of capital.
2.4 Government
Government spending is fixed and equal to G¯. To finance itself, government taxes house-
holds and issues debt, which is bought by banks. Lump sum taxes are set in order to
prevent large deviations of debt from its steady state level:
Tt = T¯ + γ(Bt − B¯) (8)
where Bt is the level of debt in the market at time t. In steady state, Bt = B¯. The
parameter γ determines how much taxes fall when government debt is reduced.8
The government issues debt with the following maturity structure: every period a
fraction µ of the outstanding debt stock comes due and 1− µ goes on to add to the next
period’s debt pile. This is equivalent to assuming the government always issues debt with
varying maturities, being 1−µ the ratio between the amount of debt coming due in t+ 1
and the amount coming due in t.
7As pointed out by Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010), adjustment costs enhance the quantitative performance of the model
without adding much complication.
8Section 3.5.2 considers a fiscal policy rule that depends on the real value of debt.
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The objective of the paper is to study the effect of a debt restructuring caused by
an exogenous policy shock. We introduce this possibility in the model by assuming that
repayment is given by a random variable mt ∈ [0, 1]. The variable mt represents the
actual fraction of debt coming due at t that is repaid, and it is given by:
mt = min{ιt, 1} (9)
where
ιt = ριιt−1 + (1− ρι) + ιt (10)
where ρι is a positive constant and ιt is a normally distributed error term with mean 0
and standard deviation σι. In steady state, ιt = 1, meaning that the government fully
repays the amount of debt that comes due in t. However, the fraction to be repaid is
subject to shocks.
A debt restructuring episode triggered by a policy decision is captured by a one-off
negative shock on ι. The auto-regressive specification captures the fact that in case of
debt restructuring, sovereigns tend to repudiate short term debt in order to lengthen
the debt repayment profile. So repayment drops in the first periods following a default
episode but grow in time, tending again to a hundred percent of the maturing fraction as
the shock vanishes completely.9
In each period, the government repays µmt of the debt. The price of government debt
χt is the expected discounted sum of the amount to be received in the next period and
the value of the remaining debt held in the balance sheet.
χt = EtβΛt,t+1 [µmt+1 + (1− µ)χt+1] (11)
A shock to mt affects not only the haircut in t, but also the expected repayment in
the following periods, which induces changes in bonds’ prices, directly influencing banks’
balance sheets and investment decisions.
The gross return on bonds is the ratio between the value to be payed back by the
government in the next period plus the expected value of the remaining outstanding debt
divided by the current price of debt:
Rbt+1 =
µmt+1 + (1− µ)Etχt+1
χt
(12)
The government’s financing requirement for period t + 1, χtAt+1, is the difference
between the fraction of debt repaid (µBt times the fraction effectively honoured mt) and
9Besides allowing for the simulation of a debt restructuring episode, this specification can also capture the fact that
sovereign debt is risky. The standard deviation of ιt can be calibrated to capture this risk.
9
the amount of government spending that is not covered by taxes (primary deficit):
χtAt+1 = µmtBt +Gt − Tt (13)
The total outstanding debt in t+ 1 is given by:
Bt+1 = (1− µ)Bt + At+1 (14)
2.5 Banks
Following Gertler and Karadi (2011), banks can raise funds from households in form
of deposits or from retained earnings, accumulating net worth. They use the available
funds to buy state-contingent securities from good producers, but also to buy government
bonds Bt+1 at price χt. Banks are the only agents that buy sovereign debt. A bank’s
balance sheet is composed by the assets it holds (government bonds and private securities),
liabilities (deposits) and net worth:
χtBt+1 +QtKt+1 = Nt +Dt (15)
where Nt is a banker’s net worth and Dt are deposits raised from households, and we used
St = Kt+1. Net worth in t + 1 is the gross payoff from assets funded at t net of returns
to depositors. Let Rkt+1 denote the gross rate of return on a unit of a bank’s private
securities from t to t+ 1. The net worth then is given by:
Nt+1 = Rkt+1QtKt+1 +Rbt+1χtBt+1 −Rt+1Dt+1 (16)
with
Rkt+1 =
Zt+1 + (1− δ)Qt+1
Qt
The objective of a banker is to maximize its future terminal value, given by the dis-
counted value of net worth, accounting for the probabilities that she exits at each period:
Vt = Et
[ ∞∑
i=1
(1− θ) θi−1βiΛt,t+iNt+i
]
(17)
The bank’s ability to obtain funds is limited by a moral hazard constraint as in Gertler
and Karadi (2011). At each period, a banker may choose to divert a fraction λ of her assets
in the form of dividends to her family and hence defaults on part of her debt. In this case,
the remaining fraction 1− λ of her assests will be recovered by other depositors, leading
the bank to bankruptcy. This fraction λ is exogenous and constant. This constraint could
also be interpreted as a leverage constraint imposed by official regulation, along the lines
of the Basel Agreements. In equilibrium, leverage is pinned down by this constraint.
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Anticipating the possibility of funds diversion, depositors will limit their lendings to
ensure banks won’t divert funds. The bank’s value must be at least as large as its gain
from deviating funds, so as to discourage diversion.
Vt ≥ λ(χtBt+1 +QtKt+1) (18)
The expressions in (15) and (16) yield the evolution of the bank’s net worth as a
function of the state variables Kt, Bt and Nt−1:
Nt = (Rkt −Rt)Qt−1Kt + (Rbt −Rt)χt−1Bt +RtNt−1 (19)
Let Vt(Kt+1, Bt+1, Nt) be the maximized value of the bank’s objective. It will satisfy the
following Bellman equation.
Vt(Kt+1, Bt+1, Nt) = EtβΛt,t+1{(1− θ)Nt+1 + θMax [Vt+1(Kt+2, Bt+2, Nt+1)]} (20)
In each period, the banker chooses a portfolio composition of capital and bonds, Kt+1 and
Bt+1, in order to maximize her value function subject to the incentive constraint and the
law of motion for net worth, taking into account that she exits with probability (1− θ).
We conjecture the value function is a linear function of the balance sheets’ components:
Vt(Kt+1, Bt+1, Nt) = νtQtKt+1 + ζtχtBt+1 + ηtNt (21)
In the Appendix we show that this conjecture is true, as long as:
ηt = EtβΛt,t+1Ωt+1Rt+1 (22)
νt = EtβΛt,t+1Ωt+1 (Rkt+1 −Rt+1) (23)
ζt = EtβΛt,t+1Ωt+1 (Rbt+1 −Rt+1) (24)
with
Ωt+1 = 1− θ + θ [φt+1ζt+1 +$t+1(νt+1 − ζt+1) + ηt+1] (25)
and
$t ≡ QtKt+1
Nt
(26)
Each component of the banks’ value function can be interpreted as follows: ηt is saving
in deposits’ costs from an additional unity of net worth. The variables νt and ζt are
the marginal discounted gains of expanding, respectively, private securities’ holdings and
government bonds’ holdings. Finally, Ωt is the shadow marginal value of net worth and
affects the banks’ intertemporal discount factor.
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Define φt as the leverage ratio, the maximum ratio of bank assets over equity:
φt ≡ QtKt+1 + χtBt+1
Nt
The constraint in (18) can be rewritten as:
νtQtKt+1 + ζtχtBt+1 + ηtNt ≥ λ(χtBt+1 +QtKt+1)
If this constraint binds, we get:
φt =
ηt +$t(νt − ζt)
λ− ζt (27)
2.6 Evolution of bank’s net worth
The total net worth in the banking sector equals the sum of existing banks’ net worth
Net and entering banks’ start-up capital Nnt provided by their families. The net worth
of existing banks equals the net earnings from assets over liabilities from one period
to another, i.e., earnings from holding securities plus earnings from holding government
bonds, minus costs from deposits. This expression must be multiplied by the fraction θ
of banks that survive between periods:
Net = θ [(Rkt −Rbt)$t−1 + (Rbt −Rt)φt−1 +Rt]Nt−1 (28)
Families transfer to each new banker a constant fraction ω/ (1− θ) of total assets from
exiting bankers, given by (1 − θ)[QtKt + χtBt]. Hence entering bankers’ net worth will
be:
Nnt = ω(QtKt + χtBt) (29)
Total net worth from banks in the economy is thus:
Nt = Net +Nnt
2.7 Market clearing
Output can be used for consumption, government spending or investment (including ad-
justment costs). Aggregate demand is given by:
Yt = Ct + It
[
1 + f
(
It
It−1
)]
+Gt (30)
Market clearing in the goods market requires the expression for demand in (30) to equal
supply, given by (4).
12
The banks’ balance sheet can be written as:
QtKt+1 + χtBt+1 = φtNt
Demand for securities and bonds is given by the balance sheet constraint, given by (27).
The supply of securities by firms is given by the expression for capital accumulation:
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + It
Finally, market clearing for deposits is obtained from balance sheet identity. Total
deposits supplied by families must equal the difference between banks’ assets and net
worth.
Dt = QtKt+1 + χtBt+1 −Nt
3 Results
The paper aims at understanding the effect of a sovereign debt restructuring episode
on the economy under the assumption that there are no costs from default beyond the
damage to the financial sector. Hence we simulate a shock to our model economy that
represents a debt restructuring episode triggered by an exogenous policy decision. This is
captured by a negative shock to the variable ιt. That yields a haircut on debt maturing
in each period that decreases in time, thus implying a reduction in the level of debt and
a lengthening of the debt repayment profile.
The model assumes that all asset intermediation in the economy is made through the
banking system and that sovereign debt is entirely held by banks. Since the costs of
default come from its negative effects on financial intermediation, our results can be seen
as an upper bound to this particular cost of sovereign default.
The response to shocks can be linearly approximated in the neighbourhood of a non-
stochastic steady-state. We study impulse response functions of the model variables
following a negative shock to debt payments.10
3.1 Calibration
The persistence of the shock is set to match some empirical evidence from default episodes.
The shock has a persistence of 0.9, vanishing only after ten years. Debt price falls instantly
by 13% following the shock. The initial haircut is set to 40% of the maturing debt,
10Simulations were conducted using Dynare. The results presented in the paper consider a first order approximation
around the steady state of the model. Second order effects were also considered and are discussed later in the paper.
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and decreases exponentially according to the persistence parameter, so that subsequent
realizations of the variable mt represent consecutive but decreasing in size haircuts, that
are significant up to around 8 years after the initial shock.11
Values assigned to utility parameters follow conventional calibration in the literature.
For the household sector, the discount factor β is set to 0.99. The parameters of the GHH
preferences are also chosen as usual. Labour disutility equals 1 and the Frisch inverse
elasticity of labour supply, ϕ, is set to 3, implying a labour supply elasticity equal to 1/3.
In case of labour income taxes, these values imply that the Laffer curve peaks when the
labour tax rate is around 75%.12
The parameters for the banking sector were set to match three moments also tracked
by Bocola (2014): (i) a steady state spread of capital return over risk-free rate of 1%, (ii)
a leverage ratio of 4.3 and, (iii) an average horizon of a decade for bankers. The fraction
λ that a banker can divert to her household equals 0.375, the proportional transfer to new
banks ω is set to 0.002, and the probability a banker survives in the following period, θ,
equals 0.97.
Parameters of the production sector were calibrated to match steady state values of the
main macroeconomic aggregates of the European Union in 2012 (as well as the moments of
the financial sector used in Bocola (2014)). The share of capital in the production function,
α, was set to 0.3 and depreciation rate δ is 2,5% per quarter. The ratios Investment/GDP,
Consumption/GDP and Government Spending/GDP have been set, respectively, to 20,
58 and 22%. Weighted debt-to-GDP average ratio across EU countries in 2012 was 85%
and hence represents total debt in our model economy. Using these relations, we have a
debt-to-capital ratio in the economy of around 10% and a debt-to-total assets of around
8,5%.13 Table 3.1 shows the main targeted relations in equilibrium.14
Table 1: Main targeted steady state relations
Investment-to-GDP Debt-to-GDP Leverage Debt maturity Labour elasticity
0.2 0.85 4.3 6.6 years 0.33
11Empirical evidence suggests default episodes and debt renegotiation have an average length of 4-8 years and debt-to-
GDP ratios tend to return to initial levels. For further empirical evidence of default episodes, see Panizza, Sturzenegger
and Zettelmeyer (2009).
12Trabant and Uhlig (2011) characterize Laffer curves for EU countries in a neoclassical growth model featuring constant
Frisch elasticity preferences. They find an average peak that goes from 62 to 68%, which would imply a larger elasticity of
labour supply and thus strengthen our results.
13European data on national accounts, government debt and banking sector statistics can be found on Eurostat. Gennaioli,
Martin and Rossi (2013) find an average debt-to-total assets ratio of 9% for a sample of 18000 banks in 18 default episodes
from 1998 to 2012. This ratio has increased on average 3-4 percentage points for European countries in the last two years
(see the Financial Times article from Thompson (2013, 23 Dec)).
14The complete set of parameters and values used in the model can be found in the appendix.
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Average residual maturity of government debt in the Euroarea is 6.6 years. Since the
maturity of debt held by banks tends to be a bit shorter than the average (for liquidity
management purposes), we chose an average debt maturity of five years. Hence we set
the fraction of debt that matures each period, µ, to 0.056.15
The elasticity of taxes to debt deviation from steady state, γ, is set to 0.2 in the
baseline calibration. In Section 3.5, we analyse the effects of different fiscal policy rules.
In the next subsection we consider the case of lump-sum taxes. We then analyse the
case of distortionary taxation over labour income in the following subsection.
3.2 Lump-sum taxes
In case of lump-sum taxes, the first order condition for labour supply is simply:
Wt = ψL
ϕ
t (31)
Labour market equilibrium requires labour supply to equal labour demand. That happens
when the wage implied by both expressions (31) and (5) is the same:
ψLϕt = (1− α)
Yt
Lt
Figure 1 shows the system dynamics following the debt restructuring shock. The
negative shock to ι implies an initial reduction in debt repayments of 40%. Since around
5% of the total debt stock matures at each period, this implies an initial fall in the nominal
level of debt of only 2%, but the price of government debt falls by 13%.
The debt restructuring process generates a decline in investment owing to the decline
of banks’ net worth together with the leverage restriction they face. Banks’ assets lose
value, so they are forced to deleverage. Tigther credit reduces private investment, and the
capital stock starts to decline, which leads to a fall in output. A lower capital stock also
implies a lower marginal product of labour and wages, so households supply less hours
and output depresses further.16 However, quantitatively, this effect is not very important.
As a consequence of the drop in asset demand by banks, the spread of capital returns
over the risk free rate rises, raising the costs for new capital acquisition.
Sovereign default implies a transfer from the banks to the government. That allows
the government to charge lower taxes – which can be interpreted as removing the need
15This is also in line with Bocola (2014). For an analysis of size and composition of Euroarea government debt, see Lojsch,
Rodriguez-Vives and Slavik (2011).
16Owing to the GHH preferences, there is no wealth effect on labour supply.
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Figure 1: Lump-sum taxes
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Lump−sum taxes
for increasing taxes in order to service debt. That leads to an increase in households’ dis-
posable income, and the initial fall in investment is partially compensated by an increase
in consumption. In the banking sector, this is a reflection of the deleveraging process:
banks take fewer deposits, households face a lower demand for their savings and consume
more in the present period.
The initial increase in consumption is short lived. Capital stock keeps falling and after
around 2 years, consumption is below its steady state level. It will take long for output
and consumption to recover to pre-default levels: 15 years after the shock, output is about
half way through the recovery and consumption is still far from its steady state level. The
costs of default imposed by financial frictions are very persistent. Since the effects on
16
labour supply are an order of magnitude lower than the effects on consumption, the path
of agents’ utility mimics the path of consumption.
In sum, the debt restructuring shock weakens banks’ balance sheets and force them to
deleverage. Output drops and takes a long time to recover.17
3.3 Distortionary taxes
Avoiding a sovereign debt restructuring process often requires a tight fiscal policy. That is
also true in the context of the recent policy debate about the indebted Southern European
countries. As a concrete example, the Italian government under Mario Monti dramatically
raised taxes in 2011-2012 in what was called a “plan to save Italy”. Had Italy defaulted,
the whole European Union would have been badly affected, as banks holding Italian bonds
would suffer losses and be forced to cut credit to firms, but the austerity measures sparked
a heated policy debate.
The results in Section 3.2 capture the costs of avoiding a credit tightening but not
much of the costs of fiscal austerity because taxes are lump sum. This section considers
a debt restructuring episode in a situation with distortionary taxation and analyses the
effect of the default shock on the economy.
We consider that government revenues are obtained through taxation over labour in-
come. The Government charges a rate τt over labour income, adjusted according to debt
deviation from steady state with the same elasticity γ of the lump-sum case.
Tt = τtWtLt
with
τt = τw[1 + γ(Bt − B¯)]
where τw is a parameter calibrated to generate the same steady state tax revenue as in
the lump-sum case.18 The first order condition for labour supply is now given by:
ψLϕt = (1− τt)Wt
Labour market equilibrium then requires:
ψLϕt = (1− τt)(1− α)
Yt
Lt
17Bocola (2014) considers an increase in the probability of sovereign default that also causes the price of government
debt to fall by 13%. The effects on the net worth of banks and on the cost of credit in his simulations and in our paper
are the same. However, the effects on the economy are different. One reason behind the difference is that a sovereign debt
restructuring entails an immediate transfer from banks to the government, which is absent in the case of news shocks.
18The elasticity of taxes with respect to debt deviation, as well as debt-to-GDP and debt-to-total assets, are the same as
before.
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Figure 2 plots the response of the economy to the debt restructuring shock for the
case of both lump-sum and distortionary taxes. The imediate impact on the financial
sector after the shock is essencially the same for both cases. Banks lose some of their
net worth and need to deleverage, which affects the supply of credit for producers and
hence the capital stock. The key difference between the two cases is the reaction of labour
markets to tax adjustments after the shock. In both cases, lower demand for labour from
firms presses down the wage rate. However, in case of distortionary taxation, there is an
opposing effect: with lower taxes, workers are now willing to supply more labour because
their net earnings have increased. This effect turns out to be important.
Figure 2: Lump-sum vs. Distortionary taxes
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Although the capital stock is depressed by the investment slump and the wage rate gets
even lower than in the previous exercise, output goes up and is always above its steady
state level. Likewise, the effect on consumption is also positive. Owing to the increase in
output, it takes less time for investment to return to its pre-default levels. The increase
in labour supply is substantially higher than the decrease in labour observed in Section
3.2.
Owing to the large effect on labour, agents’ utility in this case does not mimic the
path of consumption. Nevertheless, the net effect is clear: the debt restructuring shock
leads to an increase in utility in the short run and no effects in the medium and long run
(consumption is then larger, but so is labour supply, and both effects cancel out). The
credit tightening has persistent effects on the economy, but these effects are not large
enough to offset the positive impact of lower taxes.
The message from this section is that in an economy calibrated to match some key
aggregate variables of the European Union, where financial frictions are modelled in a
standard Gertler-Karadi-Kiyotaki way, the cost of austerity from distortionary taxes beats
the cost of a financial disruption.
3.4 Government size
This extension studies the role of government size for the costs of fiscal austerity. We
compare the baseline scenario, where government spending represents 22% of the total
output and distortionary taxes are 32% of labour income to three other cases where we
vary the size of government in terms of spending to GDP and labour taxes. The three
cases are called, respectively, small, large and huge government and are displayed in the
table below. The labour tax rate (τ) in the large government case is in line with many
European economies.
Table 2: Parameters for comparison between different government sizes
Model τ G/Y
Baseline 32% 22%
Small government 20% 13%
Large government 42% 29%
Huge government 51% 35%
The results are in Figure 3. The behavior of debt price, banks’ net worth and interest
rates is very similar in all cases. The key difference is the reaction of labour supply. When
the tax rate is large, a reduction in the tax rate generates a small decline in tax revenues.
19
Hence, a decrease in the tax burden allows for a larger fall in the tax rate, which leads
to a large positive effect on labour supply. The behaviour of output depends crucially on
the increase in labour supply.
Figure 3: Government size
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As it turns out, financial disruption is a relevant cost for small governments, but as
government size gets larger, the losses from financial disruption are dwarfed by reduction
in the costs of austerity. In case of large government, the cumulated increase in output is
substantially larger than the observed decrease in case of lump-sum taxes.
The message from this section is that the government size is crucial in the comparison
20
between the costs of fiscal austerity and the losses from financial disruption. The positive
effects of debt restructuring found in Section 3.3 are stronger in case of large governments.
3.5 Extensions
3.5.1 The effect of the tax elasticity
We first study the case of a lower elasticity of taxes with respect to debt deviation. In
the baseline calibration, elasticity (γ) equals 0.2. Here, it is set to 0.12. Figure 4 displays
the results.
Figure 4: Distortionary taxes with lower tax elasticity
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When taxes react less to a reduction in debt, labour supply does not increase so much
in the short run. However, the low reaction of taxes in the short run implies that it takes
much longer for the level of debt to converge back to its steady state, leading to larger
tax cuts in the long run.
The capital stock recovers faster than in case of an initial higher tax cut. That is
because the government needs to borrow less, so banks’ balance sheets have more room
for private securities. In contrast, the labour tax rate remains below its steady state level
for a long time. As a result, output initially goes down, but more than makes up for the
initial drop in the medium and long run.
In sum, a lower tax elasticity implies a lower tax cut following the debt restruturing
shock and leads to less output and consumption in the short run but more output and
consumption in the long run.
3.5.2 The effect of expansionary fiscal policy
So far we have considered a fiscal rule based on the nominal level of debt given by ((8)).
We now assume instead that the government targets the deviation from steady state in
terms of present real value of debt:
τt = τw
[
1 + γ(χtBt − χ¯B¯)
]
Figure 5 displays the results, using γ = 0.2 as well. The key difference is that the
government now adjusts taxes instantly after the shock, reflecting the immediate fall in
debt prices that follows the haircut. This fast cut in taxes prevents the debt stock from
falling much.
Interestingly, that deepens the disruption in credit to the private sector and leads to
a negative effect on the economy. Lower taxes imply a lower reduction in borrowing
needs, which crowds out investment owing to the leverage constraint on banks. Perhaps
surprisingly, labour supply does not react as much as before despite the larger tax cuts,
because the lower levels of investment and capital imply a lower labour productivity.
Output response turns out to be negative through the whole period.
Our previous results indicated that the financial disruption caused by a sovereign debt
restructuring was compensated by the positive effect of tax cuts. This section adds an
important qualification to those results. Expansionary fiscal policy following the default
episode crowds out private invesment and precludes economic recovery. The persistence
22
Figure 5: Alternative fiscal rule
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of the effects on the financial sector implies the disruption in credit markets lasts for long,
which more than offsets any positive effect from lower distortionary taxation.
The message of this section is that a debt restructuring episode ought to be followed
by a conservative fiscal policy in order to maintain government borrowing needs at a low
level, minimizing the disruption in credit to the private sector.
3.5.3 The model with a foreign creditor
In another extension, we now suppose that a constant fraction κ of total debt is in the
hands of external creditors. Debt in the domestic economy Bdt is thus:
Bdt = (1− κ)Bt
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This is the amount of debt in bank’s balance sheets, implying that:
QtKt+1 + χtB
d
t+1 = Dt +Nt
The remainder of the model is the same as before. The government does not distinguish
between domestic and foreign bonds, as in Broner and Ventura (2011). We set kappa to
0.3.
Figure 6 shows that the introduction of foreign creditors reduces the costs of a debt
restructuring. In this case, there is a transfer of foreign resources to the domestic economy,
and nothing else changes. Hence the effects on output and welfare are even more positive
than in the previous section. As before, we are once more abstracting from other costs of
default, such as external penalties and sanctions, and possible second order effects due to
foreign creditor’s portfolio allocation following the shock.
3.5.4 Second order effects
We also solved the model and simulated a debt restructuring episode using a second order
approximation in order to capture non-linear effects that could be present in the analysis.
The results change very little. In short, returns exhibit a more volatile path towards
steady state, but the financial disruption from default is actually smaller than in our
model. The investment drop reduces from around 1.25% in the baseline case to about
1%. On average, the disruption is around 80% to 90% of what it was using only a first
order approximation. Results and figures are available upon request.
4 Final Remarks
Following the recent crisis in the highly indebted Euroarea economies, a large debate
on the merits of fiscal austerity has erupted. On the one hand, fiscal tightenings would
improve a government’s finances and reduce the risk of sovereign default. On the other
hand, such a contractionary fiscal policy would have negative effects in the economy, the
dead weight losses from taxation being an important example of such costs. One key issue
in this debate is thus the costs of sovereign default.
At the current stage, we do not know enough about those costs to formulate a clear pol-
icy prescription. This paper studies the impact of a sovereign debt restructuring episode
on the economy through the credit intermediation channel. In our quantitative exercise,
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Figure 6: Foreign creditor
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the costs of debt restructuring turn out to be smaller than the costs of distortionary taxa-
tion that would be required to serve the whole debt. The latter exerted even larger effects
in the case of sizeable governments.
There are (at least) two ways to interpret the results in this paper. One possible expla-
nation is that the Gertler-Karadi-Kiyotaki framework is not capturing well the damage
to the economy inflicted by financial disruption. However, models employing this type of
financial friction have been successful in explaining several features of the data.19 This
19Villa and Yang (2013) show the model fits the data well and the banking friction plays an important role in explaining
cycles in the UK (see also Villa (2011)); Gertler and Karadi (2013) show that long scale asset purchases work in the model
in a way that is broadly consistently with empirical evidence; Rannenberg (2013) builds on this framework and presents
a model that explains much of the behavior of investment and cost of external finance in the great recession; Meeks,
Nelson e Alessandri (2013) show that an extension of this framework captures some of the key features of an economy in
which traditional and shadow banks interact; Bocola (2014) shows his model fits well the cyclical behavior of the leverage
25
interpretation would thus cast doubts on the foundations of a fast-growing literature.
The alternative conclusion is that the negative effects of sovereign debt restructuring
on the economy through the banking sector are not large enough to offset the costs of
fiscal austerity – although a tight fiscal policy in the wake of a debt restructuring episode
is required for this result. Sovereign default is a transfer that tightens the banks leverage
constraint but loosens a government constraint and the latter effect appears to be more
important.
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A Banks allocation problem
Using the conjecture for the value function form suggested in (21), we can write the
Lagrangian for the banks’ maximization problem. Banks will maximize its terminal
value (17) subject to the constraint (18).
L = νtQtKt+1 +ζtχtBt+1 +ηtNt−µt [λ(QtKt+1 + ζtχtBt+1)− νtQtKt+1 + ζtχtBt+1 + ηtNt]
That can be simplified to
L = [νtQtKt+1 + ζtχtBt+1 + ηtNt] (1 + µt)− µtλ(QtKt+1 + ζtχtBt+1)
where µt is the Lagrangian multiplier with respect to the incentive constraint. The
first order conditions for Kt+1, Bt+1 and µt are:
νt(1 + µt) = µtλ
ζt(1 + µt) = µtλ
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λ(QtKt+1 + ζtχtBt+1) = νtQtKt+1 + ζtχtBt+1 + ηtNt
The first and second FOCs are symmetric. On the left hand side is the marginal benefit
for the bank from expanding each of the assets components and on the right hand side the
marginal cost of tightening the incentive constraint by λ. The last FOC is the incentive
constraint itself.
The constraint binds (µt > 0) only if the marginal discounted value of both the banks
assets is positive. In case the constraint binds, the FOCs for securities and bonds show
that the discounted marginal value for each of those components should be equal. It
means that in the margin, the bank is indifferent from investing resources in government
bonds or private securities.
Now we show that the conjectured form of the value function holds. From (19), (20)
and (21) we have:
νtQtKt+1+ζtχtBt+1+ηtNt = EtβΛt,t+1{(1−θ)Nt+1+θ [νt+1Qt+1Kt+2 + ζt+1χt+1Bt+2 + ηt+1Nt+1]}
Using the definitions of $t and φt, we simplify the above equation to:
LHS = EtβΛt,t+1{(1− θ)Nt+1 + θNt+1 [νt+1$t+1 + ζt+1(φt+1 −$t+1) + ηt+1]}
Inserting the definition of Ωt we get:
LHS = EtβΛt,t+1Ωt+1Nt+1
Substituting for Nt+1:
LHS = EtβΛt,t+1Ωt+1 [(Rkt+1 −Rt+1)QtKt+1 + (Rbt+1 −Rt+1)χtBt+1 +Rt+1Nt]
Comparing the terms for Kt+1, Bt+1 and Nt, we see that the conjecture holds if (23),
(24) and (22) hold.
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B Parameters and calibrated values
Households
β 0.99 Intertemporal discount rate
σ 1 Intertemporal elasticity of substitution
ψ 1 Labour weight in utility
ϕ 3 Inverse elasticity of labour supply
Financial Intermediaries
λ 0.375 Fraction of assets that can be diverted
ω 0.002 New banks initial capital transfer
θ 0.97 Banks survival rate
Firms
α 0.30 Capital fraction in production function
δ 0.025 Exogenous depreciation rate
ηi 1.7 Inverse elasticity of net investment with respect to capital price
Government
G
Y
0.22 Steady state government expenditure
γ 0.2 Elasticity of taxes with respect to debt deviations from steady state
B
Y
0.85 Steady state government debt
µ 0.056 Fraction of debt maturing each period
Shocks
ρι 0.9 Haircut persistence parameter
σι 0.4 Haircut standard deviation
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